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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE
-----------------------------------------------------X
In the Matter of the Application of
DWIGHT JAMES,#84-A-7255,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #44-1-2013-0428.24
INDEX #141545
ORI # NY044015J

-against-

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Dwight James, verified on June 21, 2013 and filed in the St.
Lawrence County Clerk’s office on June 26, 2013. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Cayuga Correctional Facility, is challenging the October/November 2012 decision
denying him parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court
issued an Order to Show Cause on July 1, 2013. By letter dated August 6, 2013 counsel
for the respondent acknowledged that one of the numerous arguments advanced in the
petition was meritorious and, therefore, consented that the petition be granted with a de
novo parole interview to be conducted.1 Petitioner objected and the Court, by Letter
Order dated August 28, 2013, found that “[n]otwithstanding respondent’s request for the
issuance of an order directing a de novo parole interview . . . the issuance of such an order

1

As set forth in counsel’s letter, “ . . . Petitioner states that the Board failed to consider the most
recent ‘Personal Parole Summary’ packet he submitted in June 2012. Rather, Petitioner contends that the
Board relied on a similar packet, which had been submitted in 2010 for consideration during a prior hearing.
The Board has reviewed its files, and it does not have a copy of the 2012 Parole Summary packet.
Additionally, the transcript of the October 2012 hearing reflects that the Board was referencing and
considering the 2010 packet. Therefore, Respondent consents to granting Petitioner a de novo interview
to be held as soon as practical . . . “
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should await the consideration of other claims advanced in the petition.” The respondent
was therefore directed to serve answering papers. The Court has since received and
reviewed respondent’s Answer and Return, including confidential Exhibits B and C,
verified on September 20, 2013, as well as petitioner’s Reply thereto, dated September 24,
2013 and filed in the St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on September 27, 2013.
On November 14, 1984 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York
County, as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate sentence of 2 to 4 years upon his
conviction of the crime of Robbery 3°. The criminal act underlying petitioner’s 1984
conviction was committed on October 11, 1983. Petitioner was apparently arrested after
this incident but was released on bail following arraignment. On January 23, 1984, while
still at liberty on bail, petitioner committed a more serious criminal act and on November
6, 1985 he was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York County, as a second felony
offender, to a controlling indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life upon his convictions
of the crimes of Murder 2°, Robbery 2° and Robbery 1°. Petitioner’s 1985 convictions
were affirmed on direct appeal. People v. James, 75 NY2d 874, aff’g 144 AD2d 1042.
After having been denied discretionary parole release on two prior occasions,
petitioner made his third appearance before a Parole Board on October 30, 2012.
Following that appearance a decision was rendered again denying him discretionary
parole release and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The parole
denial determination reads as follows:
“FOLLOWING CAREFUL REVIEW AND DELIBERATION OF YOUR
RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THIS PANEL CONCLUDES THAT
DISCRETIONARY RELEASE IS NOT PRESENTLY WARRANTED DUE TO
CONCERN FOR THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND WELFARE.
THE
FOLLOWING FACTORS WERE PROPERLY WEIGHED AND
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CONSIDERED. YOUR INSTANT OFFESES [sic] IN MANHATTAN
INVOLVED MURDER 2ND , ROBBERY 1ST, ROBBERY 2ND AND ROBBERY
3RD.
YOUR CRIMINAL HISTORY INCLUDES A PRIOR GRAND LARCENY 3RD.
YOUR INSTITUTIONAL PROGRAMING INDICATES PROGRESS AND
ACHIEVEMENT WHICH IS NOTED TO YOUR CREDIT.
YOUR DISCIPLINARY RECORD REFLECTS TWO (2) TIER 3 REPORTS.
YOU ARE CURRENTLY IN THE SHU.
REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED,
INCLUDING YOUR RISK TO THE COMMUNITY, REHABILITATION
EFFORTS AND YOUR NEEDS FOR SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY REENTRY. YOUR DISCRETIONARY RELEASE, AT THIS TIME, WOULD
THUS NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF SOCIETY AT
LARGE AND WOULD TEND TO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF
THE INSTANT OFFENSE(S) AND UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE
LAW.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the parole denial
determination was received by the DOCCS Parole Appeals Unit on January 25, 2013. The
Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its findings and recommendation within the fourmonth time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c). This proceeding ensued.
As noted previously, the respondent herein has already consented that the petition
be granted with a de novo parole interview conducted. This concession was based upon
the acknowledgment that petitioner’s 2012 Parole Board failed to consider his 2012 parole
summary packet. Petitioner’s objection notwithstanding, this turn of events potentially
supported the immediate issuance of judgment granting the petition and remanding the
matter to the Board for a de novo interview. See Hartwell v. Division of Parole, 57 AD3d
1139. To the extent this Court nevertheless determined that the issuance of such a
judgment “ . . . should await the consideration of other claims advanced in the petition,”
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it was not the Court’s intent to address and dispose of every argument advanced in the
petition prior to the issuance of the judgment/remand order. Rather, the Court was
concerned that if certain discreet, narrowly applicable causes of action were not addressed
prior to remand, such causes of action would likely escape judicial review for many
months, to the detriment of petitioner. In this Decision and Judgment, therefore, the
Court will limit its consideration to petitioner’s “other claims” that the COMPAS ReEntry
Risk Assessment instrument was ignored by the Parole Board and that no Transitional
Accountability Plan (TAP) was prepared for consideration by the Parole Board in
determining whether or not petitioner should be released to parole supervision.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate while in the custody of the
department . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration
to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the
sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the
presentence probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and
aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement;
and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of
offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole supervision and
institutional confinement . . .”
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Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Citing Executive Law §259-c(4) and (12), petitioner argues that the Parole Board
was required to measure his level of rehabilitation and the likelihood of this success upon
parole release through “ . . . THE UTILIZATION OF A RISK AND NEEDS INSTRUMENT
(I.E., COMPAS AND TAP) THAT WOULD BE ADMINISTERED TO ALL INMATES
ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE SUPERVISION.” (Emphasis in original).

According to

petitioner, “THE BOARD TOTALLY IGNORED THE COMPAS OVERALL RISK
POTENTIAL, WHICH INDICATED PETITIONER’S OVERALL RISK POTENTIAL WAS
‘LOW’ ACROSS ALL CENTRAL CATEGORIES.” In addition, petitioner argues that no
TAP was prepared/considered in connection with the parole denial determination.
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b,
effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the New York State Board of Parole shall
“ . . .establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such
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persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining
which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .” (Emphasis added).2 Since
petitioner does not specifically challenge the implementation procedures put into effect
by the Board of Parole in response to the amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4), such
potential issue will not be addressed in this Decision and Judgment.
The Court first notes that as a part of the same legislative enactment (L 2011, ch 62,
part C, subpart A) wherein Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended - albeit with a different
effective date - the list of factors that must be considered in connection with discretionary
parole release decisions was amended/consolidated in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as
quoted previously in this Decision and Judgment. Although the list of statutory factors
set forth in the amended version of Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) does not include
reference to any risk and need assessment instrument or risk and need assessment
principles, the statute nevertheless mandates consideration of the prospective parolee’s
“ . . . institutional record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interactions with staff and inmates,” as well as his/her “release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services available
. . .” Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)(i) and (iii). Thus, whatever else the import of the
amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4), the Parole Board must “incorporate risk and

2

Prior to the amendment the statute had provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall
“ . . .establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state
board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
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needs principles” in measuring/assessing the mandatory factors set forth in Executive
Law §259-i(2)(c)(A).
A Parole Board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required
to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision. See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is
supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that
it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted).
With respect to the COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment instrument prepared in
conjunction with the consideration of petitioner for discretionary parole release, it is
noted that such instruments scores petitioner as a low risk for felony violence or rearrest.
This fact was acknowledged, on the record, by one of the commissioners presiding at
petitioner’s October 30, 2012 Parole Board interview. Although the Appellate Division,
Third Department has determined that a risk and needs assessment instrument (such as
COMPAS) must be utilized in connection with post-September 30, 2011 parole release
determinations (see Linares v. Evans, ___AD3d ____, 2013 NY Slip Op 08189, Malerba
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v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1067 and Garfield v. Evans, 108 AD3d 830), this Court finds nothing
in such cases, or the amended statute, to suggest that the quantified risk assessment
determined through utilization of a risk and needs assessment instrument supercedes the
independent discretionary authority of the Board of Parole to determine, based upon its
consideration of the factors set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an
inmate should be released to parole supervision. In this regard it is noted that the “risk
and need principles” that must be incorporated pursuant to the amended version of
Executive Law §259-c(4), while intended to measure the rehabilitation of a prospective
parolee as well as the likelihood that he/she would succeed under community-based
parole supervision, serve only to “ . . . assist members of the state board of parole in
determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .” Executive Law
§259-c(4)(emphasis added). Thus, while the Parole Board was required to consider the
COMPAS instrument when exercising its discretionary authority to determine whether
or not petitioner should be released from DOCCS custody to community-based parole
supervision, it was not bound by the quantified results of the COMPAS assessment and
was free to grant or deny parole based upon its independent assessment of the factors set
forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A). See Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896. In the case
at bar the Parole Board ultimately concluded that a denial of parole was warranted based
upon the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration as well as his prison
disciplinary record.
Turning to the TAP issue, the Court notes that as part of the same legislative
enactment (L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A) wherein Executive Law §§ 259-c(4) and 259i(2)(c)(A) were amended, a new Correction Law § 71-a was added, as follows:
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“Upon admission of an inmate committed to the custody of the department
[DOCCS] under an indeterminate or determinate sentence of
imprisonment, the department shall develop a transitional accountability
plan. Such plan shall be a comprehensive, dynamic and individualized case
management plan based on the programming and treatment needs of the
inmate. The purpose of such plan shall be to promote the rehabilitation of
the inmate and their successful and productive reentry and reintegration
into society upon release. To that end, such plan shall be used to prioritize
programming and treatment services for the inmate during incarceration
and any period of community supervision.”
Although Correction Law §71-a became effective on September 30, 2011, the Court finds
nothing in the legislative enactment to suggest that it was intended to mandate the
preparation of TAP plans with respect to inmates - such as petitioner - already in DOCCS
custody prior to the effective date of the statute.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is granted, without costs or disbursements, but
only to the extent that the October/November 2012 parole denial determination is overturned and the matter remanded for de novo parole release consideration within 45 days
of the date of this Decision and Judgment, in a manner not inconsistent with this Decision
and Judgment.

Dated:

December 27, 2013 at
Indian Lake, New York

___________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Justice, Supreme Court
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